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Résumé : Lorsque la Western Canada Airways ouvre une nouvelle voie aérienne le long 
de la Vallée Mackenzie en 1929, elle le fait avec une flotte entièrement composée d’avions 
de modèle ‘Fokker Super Universal’. Toutefois, avant la fin de l’année 1933, la compagnie 
considère déjà le ‘Super Universal’ comme désuet, et commence à le remplacer par 
d’autres modèles d’avion. En seulement quatre ans, le ‘Fokker Super Universal’ perd son 
statut de pointe et devient obsolète. Tout en étudiant la décision de la Western Canada 
Airways’ de remplacer les ‘Supers’, cet article porte un regard sur la nature de 
l’obsolescence, démontrant que la soudaine désuétude de l’appareil ne résulte pas de 
changements techniques dramatiques ou de percées majeures dans le design d’autres 
appareils. Le ‘Super Universal’ devient plutôt obsolète en raison des changements de son 
contexte d’utilisation. L’émergence d’une ‘ruée’ vers les minerais du ‘Great Bear Lake’, 
l’introduction de nouveaux modèles d’avions dans la région, l’accroissement de la 
compétition, ainsi que les changements d’attentes de la clientèle encouragent la direction 
de la Western Canada Airways’ à réévaluer sa définition de ce qui constitue une 
technologie ‘supérieure’ dans la vallée Mackenzie. Si le contexte de 1929 a fait du ‘Super 
Universal’ la meilleure option, dès le fin de 1933, ces circonstances ont évolué de manière 
à rendre le ‘Super’ obsolète. En retraçant cet épisode de l’histoire de l’aviation canadienne, 
cet article explorera les dimensions contextuelles de l’obsolescence et le rôle des 
circonstances historiques dans le déclin technologique. 
Abstract: When Western Canada Airways began flying its pioneering air route down the 
Mackenzie Valley in 1929, it did so with a fleet comprised entirely of Fokker Super 
Universal aircraft.  By the end of 1933, however, the airline had declared the Super 
Universals obsolete, replacing them with other aircraft models.  In only four years, the 
Fokker Super Universal had gone from state of the art to obsolescent.  Exploring Western 
Canada Airways' decision to replace the Supers, this paper offers insight into the nature of 
obsolescence, demonstrating that the aircraft did not achieve this status because of 
technical changes or dramatic technical breakthroughs in the design of other aircraft.  
Instead, the Super Universal became obsolete because of changes in its use-context.  The 
rise of the Great Bear Lake mineral rush, the introduction of new sorts of aircraft into the 
region, increased competition, and changing passenger expectations all encouraged 
Western Canada Airways' management to re-evaluate their definition of what constituted a 
superior technology within the context of the Mackenzie Valley.  While conditions in 1929 
made the Super Universal the best possible choice, by the end of 1933 those circumstances 
had changed such that the Super was now obsolete.  By tracing this episode in Canadian 
aviation history, this paper will explore the contextual dimensions of obsolescence and the 
role of historical circumstances in effecting technological decline. 
2 Marionne Cronin 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Canadian prospectors were busily engaged 
in pushing back the country’s northern frontier. As they sought to reach 
ever further into the wilderness of the Canadian Shield, they turned to 
bush pilots and their planes for transport support. Conceived in response 
to Canada’s transport environment in the interwar decades, bush flying 
developed in tandem with the northern resource industries. First used in 
forestry, aircraft soon offered important transport services for prospectors 
and mining developers. By using float and ski-equipped aircraft to land on 
water or ice, bush pilots were able to exploit the North’s geography and 
transform a transportation obstacle, the rocky hills, lakes, and rivers of the 
Shield, into the basis of a new aviation system that did not rely on fixed 
landing strips and wheeled aircraft. Canadian Airways Limited (CAL), 
Canada’s largest commercial airline of the 1920s and 1930s, was one such 
company, operating bush services across the Shield.1 In 1929, the 
company decided to extend its commercial service north along the 
Mackenzie River, reaching all the way to Aklavik on the shores of the 
Beaufort Sea. Facing the rigors of northern flying, the airline made the 
Fokker Super Universal the backbone of its Mackenzie fleet. Looking 
back, the company president, James A. Richardson, would declare that, at 
the time, the Super was the only available plane appropriate for bush 
operations along the Mackenzie.2 Only five short years later, however, 
C.H. Dickins, the company’s Mackenzie District Superintendent, would 
begin withdrawing the aircraft from northern service.3  
The Fokker Super Universal’s rapid decline raises a set of interesting 
questions, most intriguingly: what had happened to transform the users’ 
perception of the Super Universal? One might assume it was a case of 
technological progress—a new and better design replacing the previous 
leader. However, there had been no dramatic technical breakthroughs in 
mid-sized transport aircraft design to render the Super Universal outdated. 
In fact, the planes operating along the Mackenzie in the early 1930s were 
all part of the same generation of high-wing, multi-purpose transports 
developed in the mid-to-late 1920s.  
                                                      
1. The airline began life as Western Canada Airways and, after a series of 
amalgamations, changed its name to Canadian Airways Limited in 1931. 
2. Archives of Manitoba, Canadian Airways Limited Collection (hereafter AM-CALC), 
MG 11 A 34, Box 6, Correspondence, James A. Richardson, “Canadian Airways Limited, 
Memorandum,” 7 April 1934; See also, AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 42, Edmonton and 
McMurray Base Correspondence, C.H. Dickins, “Report on Conditions McKenzie [sic] 
River District,” 20 February 1931. 
3. “The subject of new equipment to replace what is agreed to be positively obsolete (this 
applies to all of the equipment of the Company except the Junkers, Sikorsky Amphibian 
and Fairchild 71C) is a very complicated one…,” AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 6, 
Correspondence, W.C. Sigerson to Dickins, 2 January 1934. 
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So what had happened? This case study suggests that the answer to that 
question was complex. New centres of activity and hence new transport 
routes emerged after the Fokker Super Universal’s introduction. These 
changes, which were themselves partly the result of aircraft use (notably 
the discovery of radium at Great Bear Lake), reconfigured the region’s 
geography. As a consequence, aircrafts’ use-patterns changed. This new 
geography met changing economic conditions, specifically the Great 
Depression and the appearance of aerial competition along the Mackenzie, 
which in turn altered users’ perceptions of the available technology. 
Changes in the region’s geography help to explain the Super Universal’s 
passage from fleet backbone to retired aircraft. The following pages 
analyse the interaction between physical geography and historical 
developments, demonstrating the importance of incorporating such an 
analysis into the history of technology. 
Historians of science and technology have previously considered the 
utility of exploring their subjects with reference to the importance of 
place. Historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes, along with historians 
of science such as Mary Jo Nye and Jonathan Harwood, highlight the 
important influence of national context, including institutions, politics, 
economics, and culture, on the development of particular approaches to 
science or technology. More recently, David Edgerton has argued that 
technologies have different trajectories in different places and that a 
failure to look beyond a northern or a western context risks missing that 
difference. Other historians, such as Dianne Menghetti, raise important 
questions about the utility of this framework in the context of technologies 
that flow across borders. This warning is particularly relevant in the 
history of northern Canadian aviation, especially before the development 
of Canadian-manufactured bush planes, as aircraft migrated from one 
national context to another as they moved from manufacturer to user. 
Although we are right to be cautious, the history of Canadian aviation, 
including this case study, indicates that place plays a significant role in the 
history of technology.4 
                                                      
4. David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jonathan Harwood, “National Styles in Science: 
Genetics in Germany and the United States between the World Wars,” Isis 78, 3 (1987): 
390-414; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-
1930 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Diane Menghetti, 
“Invention and Innovation in the Australian Non-Ferrous Mining Industry: Whose 
Technology?” Australian Economic History Review 45, 2 (2005): 204-219; Mary Jo Nye, 
“National Styles? French and English Chemistry in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries,” Osiris 8 (1993): 30-49. 
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The recent geographical turn in the history of science and technology, 
exemplified by David Livingstone’s work, reinforces the importance of 
place in this history.5 However, there is a tendency to focus on the locus 
of scientific practice—such as the field station, hospital, or laboratory—
and the ways in which science and these places construct one another. 
This paper seeks to expand this focus by incorporating physical 
geography into the history of technology. Using the Super Universal’s life 
along the Mackenzie as a case study, this analysis expands technology’s 
relevant historical context to include the influence of geography and will 
consider how aircraft and historical developments reconfigured northern 
geography, which in turn altered how users perceived different aircraft 
and changed the models they selected as best suited to their needs.  
When it began its Mackenzie River air service, the very nature of 
northern bush flying encouraged Canadian Airways’ decision-makers to 
value characteristics such as ruggedness, reliability, versatility, manoeu-
vrability, the ability to access remote wilderness locations year-round, and 
the capacity to carry a variety of cargos—all characteristics the airline’s 
management identified in the Super Universal. The company’s confidence 
came partly from the Super’s own design and partly from the airline’s 
experience with the aircraft’s predecessor, the Fokker Universal.  
Developed in 1928, the Super Universal was a high-winged mid-sized 
transport with a fabric-covered metal fuselage frame, and square, boxy 
silhouette topped with Fokker’s signature thick, cantilevered, wooden-
framed, plywood-covered wing (see fig. 1). Equipped with a Pratt & 
Whitney Wasp engine of 400 hp, the aircraft was capable of maintaining a 
cruising speed of 118 mph with a payload of 750-800 lbs. Previous 
operating experience with the Super’s older sibling, the Fokker Universal, 
on Canadian Airways’ southern bush routes, the Canadian government’s 
Hudson Strait Expedition (1927), Canadian Airways’ 15,000 lbs Hudson 
Bay freight contract (1927), as well as C.H. Dickins’ success with a Super 
on his Barren Lands flight of 1928 all suggested Fokker’s aircraft were 
well-adapted to northern bush flying. Based on this acquaintance and the 
Super Universal’s performance capacities, Canadian Airways selected the 
aircraft as the backbone of its Mackenzie District fleet. 
 
 
         
                                                      
5. David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientific 
Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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Figure 1.  CF-AJC, Canadian Airways’ Fokker Super Universal, 1930. 
 
Source: Alberta Aviation Museum Photo Collection, 202151. Courtesy of the Alberta Aviation 
Museum and the Faltinson Collection. 
As it turned out, the Super Universals would have significant difficulties 
operating in the northern winter. To understand these challenges and the 
airline’s response requires a short technical digression. Underneath its 
cantilevered wings, the Fokker Super Universal was equipped with 
“vertical struts fitted with shock absorbers between axles and front wing 
spar, taking the bulk of wing weight directly instead of through [the] 
fuselage. [The] shock absorbers [were] formed of elastic cord [wound] 
over pins…”6 This arrangement had originally been designed on the 
assumption that the Fokker Super Universal would operate on wheels. 
However, equipping the aircraft as a bush plane meant fitting it with floats 
or skis, thereby eliminating the rubber tires’ shock absorbing capacity. 
When the aircraft encountered extremely cold weather, the rubber cords 
would loose their elasticity, forcing the thin metal struts to absorb all the 
                                                      
6. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 32, Fokker Aircraft, Individual Fokker Aircraft, 
Atlantic Aircraft Corporation, “Standard Specification, Fokker Super-Universal 
Monoplane,” 12 June 1928; C.G. Seaborn, “Anatomy and Oddities: An Inside Look at a 
Pioneering Canadian Bushplane 1929-1937,” Canadian Aviation Historical Society 
Journal 35, 1 (1997): 20-21. 
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landing force, snapping or bending the strut, and rendering the aircraft 
unusable.7 These undercarriage failures occurred at such a rate that the 
airline became seriously concerned.8 
Despite these technical difficulties, the company did not replace the 
Super. Instead, the airline’s management chose to invest time and energy 
working with the manufacturer to develop a solution. This process took 
some time, but in the autumn of 1930, responding to the advice of its 
pilots, the airline began to incorporate aerol struts into the Super’s 
undercarriage. These aerol struts, which replaced the bungee cord 
arrangement, used a cylinder filled with air to absorb the forces of landing 
and taxiing. Unlike the rubber bungee cords, as long as the parts were well 
lubricated, the aerol shock would continue to function even under the 
coldest temperatures. After these modifications, in 1931 C.H. Dickins, 
now the Mackenzie District Superintendent, reaffirmed his belief that 
these aircraft were “the best equipment now available for the kind of work 
that [the company was] doing.”9 
Although the shocks functioned well through the winter of 1930-1931, 
earning high praise from Canadian Airways’ pilots, in the winter of 1931-
1932, the northern climate again exacted its price. That season, winter 
temperatures dropped so low that the lubricating oil in the aerol struts 
congealed. When this happened, the shocks would often compress and 
jam, forcing the strut to absorb the excess stresses, which translated into 
collapsing undercarriages. Again, the company chose to make adjustments 
rather than abandon the aircraft as unsuitable to the North. By substituting 
lighter oil, Canadian Airways’ engineers were able to correct the problem 
by the spring of 1932.  
However, just as the airline appeared to have adapted the aircraft to suit 
the Mackenzie’s environment, Canadian Airways began removing the 
plane from Mackenzie District service and replacing it with other aircraft. 
This despite the company’s three-year investment in modifying the 
aircraft to suit the region. Company records reveal that the reasons for this 
shift had very little to do with the Super Universal’s internal 
arrangements. The change in policy had much more to do with 
developments that occurred in the Mackenzie Valley during 1932. 
                                                      
7. The struts had a wall-thickness of 0.095" and the manufacturer recommended a 
thickness of at least 0.120" for ski flying. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 32, Fokker 
Aircraft, Individual Fokker Aircraft, Charles Froesch to W.L. Brintnell, 16 January 1929. 
8. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 1, Correspondence, Brintnell to Dickins, 22 February 
1929; AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 42, Edmonton and McMurray Base Correspondence, 
Dickins to Brintnell, 15 April 1930. 
9. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 42, Edmonton and McMurray Base Correspondence,  
Dickins, “Report on Conditions McKenzie [sic] River District,” 20 February 1931. 
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Perhaps the most significant of these changes was the discovery of 
radium on the shores of Great Bear Lake. Prospector and mine developer 
Gilbert Labine had identified the mineral’s presence in the fall of 1929 
and, over the next two years, Labine’s own activities and the 
investigations of other mining companies, reinforced by government ore 
analyses, contributed to growing excitement about the area. This interest 
culminated in a prospecting rush that broke upon the Mackenzie District 
in the spring of 1932.10 The prospecting rush caused a sharp increase in 
passenger and cargo traffic to the area, providing a lucrative route for the 
northern airline. Indeed, the amount of cargo Canadian Airways carried to 
Great Bear Lake rose from 10,520 lbs in 1930 to 110,076 lbs in 1932.11 
The growth of radium prospecting and, subsequently, mining, also 
reconfigured the region’s geography, creating a new centre and altering 
aircraft transport routes. At the eastern end of Great Bear Lake, the 
mining camps were well off the established Canadian Airways route, 
which followed the Mackenzie River. To reach Great Bear, planes would 
either turn east from Fort Norman and fly from the Mackenzie to the lake, 
or they would head north across Great Slave Lake, through Fort Rae to the 
eastern arm of Great Bear. The distances between the regular stops on the 
river were long compared to other bush routes in Canada (averaging 150 
miles) but the distances on the legs to Great Bear were even farther. The 
distance from Fort Norman to McConnell Point on Great Bear was 200 
miles, while the distance from Great Bear to Fort Simpson was 460 miles. 
This development would come to have a significant effect on the Super 
Universals’ fortunes. 
The flood of traffic from the Great Bear rush was a boon to Canadian 
Airways, especially given the economic situation in the rest of Canada. 
The economic depression that had gripped the country since 1929 had 
grave implications for the company. Canadian politicians responded to the 
crisis with a policy of economic belt-tightening. In the face of so much 
distress, the government-sponsored airmail services that Canadian 
Airways operated in Eastern Canada and on the Prairies began to seem 
increasingly unnecessary luxuries and, in keeping with its overall 
approach, the government began cancelling the services, eventually 
suspending them completely in the spring of 1932. 
The loss of this income, combined with declining general traffic, was a 
significant blow to Canadian Airways’ bottom line and made the airline’s 
remaining airmail contracts and any bush flying business even more 
                                                      
10. Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984). 
11. CALC-AM, MG 11 A 34, Box 63, Statistics, C.M. Forrest to Sigerson, 26 January 
1934.  
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essential to the company’s survival (see table 1). In 1931, mail formed 
65% of Canadian Airways’ operating revenues. This dropped to just under 
35% following the airmail cancellations. Of this, the Mackenzie District 
airmail contract was worth $45,000 per year.12 As a result, it was vital the 
airline make as great a profit from the Great Bear Lake rush as possible. 
Thus, the company needed to be able to handle as much of the traffic as it 
could. However, the appearance of competition in January of 1932, in the 
form of Mackenzie Air Service, had complicated the situation. It was this 
combination of economic developments, competition, and geography that 
would alter Canadian Airways’ evaluation of the Fokker Super Universal 
by redefining the managers’ views on the aircraft’s capacity, performance, 
and comfort. 
Table 1.   Canadian Airways Traffic. 
 1931 1932 1933 
Mail (Mackenzie) 42,829 lbs 71,432 lbs 53,842 lbs 
Passengers (Mackenzie)   961 1,405 882 
Express (Mackenzie) 138,626 lbs 408,561.75 lbs 403,756 lbs 
Hours (Mackenzie) 2,061.50 4,093.25 3,270.40 
Miles (Mackenzie) 208,653 408,192 329,735 
Total Passengers 6,370 4,501 5,362 
Total Express  647,596.12 lbs 1,427,114.12 lbs 2,106,109 lbs 
Total Hours 13,889.13 8,942.40 8,633.05 
Total Miles 1,318,621 856,584 810,751.2 
Source: AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 63, Statistics, C.M. Forrest to W.C. Sigerson, 26 January 1934. 
Founded by Canadian Airways’ former employee, W.L. Brintnell, this 
competitor’s presence would buttress Canadian Airways’ preoccupation 
with cargo capacity and efficiency. To begin with, Mackenzie Air 
Service’s emergence reinforced Canadian Airways’ need to accommodate 
the growing levels of Great Bear Lake traffic.13 Now, if Canadian 
Airways could not accommodate the traffic, the business would not wait 
until the airline could carry it. Instead, it would go to the competition, 
resulting in a loss of income for Canadian Airways. 
                                                      
12. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 64, Statistics, CAL Statistics 1931-1933, 1934,  
Sigerson to R.W. Finlayson, 13 February 1933 (Accounting and Statistical Data, All 
Lines); AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 28, Commercial Airways, “Transfer of Contract,” 
24 September 1931; AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 23, Annual Report, “Annual Report, 
Canadian Airways Limited, For the Year Ended December 31, 1932”; NAC, MG 30 E 
243, vol. 5, J.A. Wilson Papers, Specific Correspondence, 1920-1942, J.A. Wilson to 
Charles G. Grey, 20 May 1932. 
13. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 63, Statistics, Forrest to Sigerson, 26 January 1934. 
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Moreover, early in 1933, reports reached Canadian Airways 
management that Mackenzie Air Service was engaging in rate cutting in 
order to draw traffic away from the more established airline.14 Mackenzie 
Air Service was a smaller company with lower overheads and a second-
hand fleet that required a lower initial investment. This meant it could 
afford to offer lower rates. However, given that the airline operated 
similar aircraft to Canadian Airways, CAL’s officials were convinced that 
the only way Mackenzie Air Service could be making a profit was by 
overloading their aircraft—carrying a larger load than they were licensed 
to carry. According to C.H. Dickins, Brintnell was claiming that 
Mackenzie Air Service’s Super Universals could carry up to 2200 lbs—
nearly twice the licensed 1200 lbs payload of Canadian Airways’ Supers. 
However, Dickins pointed out, these aircraft were older than Canadian 
Airways’ and were not licensed to carry loads as high as 1200 lbs. Dickins 
suggested, “the fact that they have been carrying larger loads is due 
entirely to gross overloading.”15 In addition, Dickins claimed that 
Mackenzie Air Service flew with no gas reserve, substituting the weight 
of cargo for the weight of gas in order to increase the amount of cargo 
they could carry.16 This was a dangerous strategy in a region whose 
environment was so unforgiving of mistakes. 
As traffic declined in 1933, this competition became even more 
upsetting for Canadian Airways. Traffic levels to and from Great Bear 
Lake continued to rise, but the initial boom had finished and the rate of 
increase was levelling off. In addition, traffic along the Mackenzie as a 
whole was declining. In 1933, Canadian Airways’ Mackenzie fleet carried 
17,590 fewer lbs of mail, 4,805 fewer lbs of express cargo, and 523 fewer 
passengers than in 1932.17 In the context of the Great Depression, 
Mackenzie District traffic was essential to the airline’s health, but the 
amount available was decreasing and the competition was engaging in 
activities that damaged Canadian Airways’ ability to compete for the 
remaining, vital business. Thus, it was deeply important that the fleet had 
the largest capacity possible. As a result, payload capability became one 
of Canadian Airways’ highest priorities. 
The airline had several possible responses to the situation. For instance, 
it too could have engaged in overloading and, in fact, this had been a 
common practice in the company right up until 1932. However, company 
                                                      
14. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 28, Competitors’ Activities, G.A. Thompson to  
Dickins and Sigerson, 13 January 1933. 
15. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 14, Airmail, Great Bear–Resolution, Dickins to 
Thompson, 13 April 1933. 
16. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 34, Mackenzie Air Service Ltd, 1932-1940, Dickins to  
Thompson, 6 April 1934. 
17. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 63, Statistics, Forrest to Sigerson, 26 January 1934. 
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managers realized that if they could keep their poorer competitors to their 
aircraft’s licensed loads, the competition would not be able to make a 
profit.18 That said, if the company pursued this policy, they could not 
continue to overload their own aircraft. As R.H. Mulock pointed out to 
W.C. Sigerson, “I expect very shortly this whole question of overloading 
will be checked up by the Mounted Police, and it will be rather hard luck 
on any company which infringes on the overloading regulations.”19 
Moreover, Pratt & Whitney, the engine manufacturer, had identified 
overloading as a potential cause of a 1931-series of engine failures in 
Canadian Airways’ Mackenzie fleet. Thus, Canadian Airways focused on 
pressuring the government to enforce weight regulations along the 
Mackenzie, hoping to reduce Mackenzie Air Service’s advantage, but 
geography would also have a role to play in this part of the story. 
In order to restrict the competition’s ability to overload, Canadian 
Airways would need the government regulators to improve their 
inspection and enforcement efforts along the Mackenzie and company 
officials began lobbying the government to take such action. C.H. Dickins 
suggested to G.A. Thompson, “You may be able to take some action in 
the matter of having the Department check up on loadings of aircraft in 
the Mackenzie Valley frequently… It is suggested that the RCMP could 
be instructed to carry out examinations to see that air regulations are being 
observed.”20 In the spring of 1933, J.A. Wilson, Controller of Civil 
Aviation, announced that the RCMP had indeed been asked to include 
aviation inspection in their northern work. In addition, R.H. Mulock was 
able to report that the government had instructed its inspectors to intensify 
the frequency of inspection trips to Fort McMurray.21 This seemed to be 
good news for Canadian Airways. 
However, the promised action had not materialized by the end of the 
summer of 1933 summer. In September 1933, Dickins noted that the 
Department of National Defence’s District Inspector had not visited 
McMurray; nor was there “a single instance of checking the total loaded 
weight of any commercial aircraft operating throughout the District either 
by the R.C.M. Police or any representative of the Department of Civil 
                                                      
18. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 22, Overloading, W.E. Gilbert to H.C. Ingram, 10 
May 1933. 
19. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 22, Overloading, Sigerson to R.H. Mulock, 8 
September 1933; AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 14, Airmail, Great Bear-Resolution,  
Mulock to Sigerson, 29 April 1933. 
20. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 14, Airmail, Great Bear-Resolution, Dickins to 
Thompson, 13 April 1933. 
21. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 22, Overloading, Wilson to Sigerson, 8 May 1933; 
AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 22, Overloading, Mulock to Sigerson, 5 June 1933. 
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Aviation.”22 In fact, things only began to change in the spring of 1934, 
when Gilbert reported that the competition was becoming increasingly 
peevish and that Brintnell was accusing Canadian Airways of persecuting 
him through the government. Gilbert concluded that this reaction could 
only be the result of increased government inspection restricting 
Mackenzie Air Services’ overloading.23 
Although the RCMP had increased their surveillance, there were 
indications that there was some confusion about the regulations. For 
instance, Thompson reported that, “when examining Mr. Gilbert’s 
machine at Resolution for overloading, the police advised him that he was 
500 pounds underload. I am quite sure that Gilbert would not fly with 500 
pounds less payload than he could carry, particularly at the busiest time of 
year and the only conclusion to draw is that the RCMP do not know how 
to check up on loads.”24 In fact, full government enforcement of air 
regulations would await the Department of Transport’s creation in 1937. 
The delay in government enforcement partially reflected the preoccupa-
tions of the Department of National Defence, which was responsible for 
civil aviation in this period, with military aviation. At the same time, the 
delay was a product of the logistical difficulties created by the geography of 
aviation in the Canadian North. In 1935, Wilson, who was the top civil 
servant responsible for aviation, outlined some of these obstacles, 
emphasizing the difficulties created by expansive distance. Most basically, 
the North lacked qualified inspectors. For instance, the inspector responsi-
ble for the Mackenzie was stationed in Regina. Moving the inspector from 
Regina to Edmonton, which occurred in late 1933 or early 1934, was an 
improvement. However, he was still a day’s travel away from McMurray 
and further still from points north. Moreover there was still only one 
inspector, who could not hope to blanket a region as large as the Mackenzie 
by himself. As we have seen, inspection duties were devolved to the RCMP 
in an effort to improve this, but their efforts were only partly effective. 
Regulators were compelled, therefore, to rely on second-hand reports, but 
they encountered difficulties in convincing witnesses to report on their 
employers or competition.25 Geography, in combination with limited 
resources, created a situation where it was difficult for government regula-
tors to effectively police adherence to air regulations in the Mackenzie. 
                                                      
22. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 28, Competitors’ Activities, Dickins to Thompson, 23 
September 1933. 
23. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 37, Mackenzie Air Services Ltd, Gilbert to Dickins, 18 
March 1934. 
24. AM-CALC, MG 11 A 34, Box 6, Correspondence, Thompson to Sigerson, 1 May 1934. 
25. NAC, MG 30 E 243, vol. 8, J.A. Wilson, “Inspection–Northern Bases,” 28 June 1935; 
NAC, MG 30 E 243, vol. 7, J.A. Wilson Papers, Special Correspondence, “Overloading of 
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Thus, while they waited for government regulation to restrict the 
competition’s overloading, Canadian Airways’ main strategy for 
responding to Mackenzie Air Service’s competition was to maximize the 
efficiency of its own aircraft operations so that it could compete with 
Mackenzie Air Service’s rates and still achieve a profit. In this period 
there was little slack in the Mackenzie fleet’s operating capacity. As early 
as 1932, with the advent of the Great Bear Lake rush, district managers 
were using the aircraft to the fullest and were requesting an increased fleet 
from head office. A year later, in early 1933, Canadian Airways actually 
contemplated the prospect of subcontracting business to Brintnell and his 
company. The obvious solution would be to add aircraft to the Mackenzie 
fleet, but it was not so simple. The whole of Canadian Airways’ western 
lines were experiencing an equipment shortage. Moreover, the airline’s 
financial difficulties, caused by the Depression, meant it could not simply 
purchase more aircraft.26 Thus, Canadian Airways’ managers needed to 
use their existing fleet as efficiently as possible in order to extract 
maximum profits from the routes that still brought income during the 
Depression. Management, therefore, began to evaluate its aircraft in these 
terms. The situation would not flatter the Super Universal. 
Re-examining the correspondence surrounding the Fokker Super 
Universal’s initial introduction reveals that efficiency had not been a 
central consideration. Bush flying called for certain features in an aircraft, 
particularly versatility, manoeuvrability, range, reliability, convenience, 
and year-round performance. Though originally conceived as an 
American transport, the Fokker Super Universal had many of these 
characteristics. To begin with, the aircraft was versatile. Canadian 
Airways’ Mackenzie traffic would be made of a range of cargos, 
including fur, prospecting supplies, medical emergencies, and passengers.  
Thus the airline needed an aircraft that could carry a wide variety of loads, 
both freight and passengers. Fokker’s Universal and Super Universal were 
designed to achieve this kind of versatility: the seats could be removed to 
allow the plane to carry large pieces of freight and the designers had 
included an additional cargo hold for passenger baggage. These features 
meant the plane was able to carry different types of cargo, an important 
consideration given Canadian Airways’ projected Mackenzie traffic. 
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When it came to manoeuvrability, bush pilots needed a plane that would 
enable them to reach difficult locations and that could do so with 
substantial loads. This was vital if the airline was to offer charter services 
to prospectors and field parties. Good lift was an essential component of 
manoeuvrability as it meant the aircraft could get into and out of small 
lakes, even if fully loaded and the Super displayed solid lift with a rate of 
climb of 850 feet/minute at sea level.27 Finally, the pilot and crew needed 
to be able to load cargo and passengers from awkward shorelines and the 
Super’s high wing meant it could pull up close to northern shores without 
becoming entangled in the brush. 
In the North, range was also crucial in order for the aircraft to span the 
distances between northern communities and points of call. In day-to-day 
operations this translated into the ability to fly from fuel depot to fuel 
depot. Along the Mackenzie these were generally associated with the 
settlements and were an average of 150 miles apart. The longest stretch 
between airline stops along the river was the 200 miles between Fort 
Good Hope and Arctic Red River. These were all distances well within 
the Super Universal’s maximum range of 700 miles or 4 hours flying 
time. By contrast, the Fairchild FC-2, with a payload of approximately 
700 lbs, had a range of 520 miles and the Fairchild 71C, introduced in 
1928, had a range of 625 miles.28 Because Canadian Airways began its 
Mackenzie service in the absence of competition, the Super’s range was 
initially sufficient. 
That said, there were several transport options for those who wanted to 
enter the North. Individuals and small groups continued to use canoes and 
smaller boats equipped with outboard motors. These were flexible 
methods of transport, allowing one to reach deep into the interior. 
However, these routes required difficult portages and limited the amount 
of supplies one could carry. For larger loads, there was an established 
network of larger river boats. While these river barges could carry much 
more freight than the aircraft, they did so much more slowly. In winter, 
however, these water-borne methods were denied to the traveller. With 
the rivers and lakes frozen, the other major alternative to the aircraft, the 
dog team, could not compete as a freight carrier in either speed, capacity, 
or cost.29 Measured against these competitors, the Super Universal’s 
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performance was more than adequate. Aircraft transport was also much 
easier than overland travel and much more comfortable. Nevertheless, 
because it offered much greater speed than the other forms of travel, 
passenger comfort was not as central an issue on the early bush runs. 
However, as additional competition appeared, both of these factors would 
become increasingly important. 
To promote their services, especially in an environment where the 
travelling public was still sceptical of air travel, air service operators 
needed to offer safe, reliable service. In the North, the fact that equipment 
failure could leave the pilot, passengers, and crew stranded far from a 
repair shop and perhaps caught in an unfriendly environment added an 
extra degree of importance to an aircraft’s reliability. Making repairs in 
these circumstances was even more costly than usual, as replacement parts 
often needed to be ferried to the downed aircraft by plane, which took two 
aircraft away from regular company business. Thus, reliability was an 
important feature of Canadian Airways’ Mackenzie fleet. Happily, the 
company’s previous experience with the Fokker aircraft indicated they 
could withstand demanding flying, as demonstrated by their operation on 
the Hudson Bay airlift and Barren Lands flight.30 The experience of other 
bush airlines reinforced Canadian Airways’ own evaluation. Between the 
new design features and the company’s successful experience with the 
earlier Universal, the airline believed it had an aircraft that would enable it 
to expand down the Mackenzie River and into the Northwest Territories. 
In general, the Fokker Super Universal had the attributes necessary to a 
northern workhorse: a substantial payload, good speed and range, and 
versatility. Furthermore, it had demonstrated its reliability on Canadian 
Airways’ 1927 Hudson Bay freighting contract and C.H. Dickins’ 1929 
Barren Lands flight, as well as on less spectacular routine flights in 
northern Manitoba and Ontario. With the requirements of bush flying in 
mind and given the evidence of the Super’s previous northern 
performances, it seemed a reasonable choice to use the aircraft to establish 
Canadian Airways’ Mackenzie service. However, four years later in the 
new framework of economic pressures, aerial competition, and extended 
routes, efficiency became the watchword for Canadian Airways. Within 
this new environment, the Super Universal would be judged inadequate. 
Canadian Airways’ rates were calculated based on an average gross 
load of 1200 lbs per flight.31 Achieving this load in the Super Universals 
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operating along the Mackenzie River was difficult. In order to allow 
these aircraft to carry 1200 lbs, pilots had to reduce the amount of gas 
carried. This in turn meant refuelling at each stop. However, the 
unbroken stretch between Fort Rae and Great Bear Lake on the eastern 
route to Great Bear was too long for anything less than a full tank. With 
the gas required for the journey, Super Universals used on this leg could 
carry only 800lbs of cargo.32 With the reduced cargo capacity, Canadian 
Airways obtained a smaller profit on these loads as the operating cost 
per pound of freight was higher. 
In the summer, the Supers’ performance was even worse. When 
equipped with floats, the maximum payloads of the four Super Universals 
in the Mackenzie fleet ranged between 560 lbs and 725 lbs. Eliminating 
the engineer or mechanic, who usually accompanied the pilot as flight 
crew, increased the payload by a maximum 195 lbs. By comparison, the 
Bellanca Pacemakers in the fleet could carry 900 lbs. Dickins’ assessment 
was that the Super Universals could not carry an efficient load on floats in 
a region where the average trip was at least 150 miles and called for 
nearly full tanks of gas. Thus, he judged the planes unsuited to the 
Mackenzie and better suited to districts were short trips where the norm 
and a pilot the only crew required. Instead, Dickins wanted to replace his 
Fokkers with Bellanca Pacemakers, because of their higher payloads and 
ability to manage the greater northern distances, and Fairchild FC-2W-2s, 
with their good float performance and payload of 1200 lbs on floats.33 
The Super Universal’s value further diminished in the eyes of Canadian 
Airways’ Mackenzie managers when it became apparent that faster 
machines were more economical to operate over the long distances. The 
quicker aircraft produced cost savings because they allowed the company to 
make more trips within a given period of time, thereby bringing in greater 
revenue. Although of the same era as the Fokkers, with their 300 hp Wright 
Whirlwind engines, the Bellancas had a cruising speed of 140mp (compared 
to the Super Universal’s 118 mph), in addition to their greater cargo 
capacity.34 While originally overlooked, these considerations had achieved 
new significance in a context where the competition for traffic was 
increasing and rate-cutting was an issue. 
Given that competition and rate-cutting were Canadian Airways’ main 
concerns, one of the most important points of evaluation was cargo 
capacity. Since the airline could not afford to purchase new aircraft, the 
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managers evaluated the Fokker Super Universal against the other bush 
transports already part of its fleet, namely, Bellanca Pacemakers, Fairchild 
71s, and Junkers W 33/34s. Like the Super Universal, these aircraft were 
all mid-sized transports developed in the second half of the 1920s. 
However, all three offered higher payload capacities than the Super.  
The W 33/34 presented the sharpest contrast. While older, slower, and 
possessed of a shorter range, the W 33/34 was capable of carrying 
between 2 and 3 times more payload than the Super Universal. The 
Fairchild 71 was also slower than the Super, but it too had a higher 
payload capacity. The smaller Bellanca had a higher payload, faster 
cruising speed, and longer range, despite having a weaker engine. 
Although the Super Universal was faster than the W 33/34 and the 71, and 
had a longer range, the Mackenzie District’s context encouraged Canadian 
Airways to value payload capacity most highly. A higher payload meant 
the company could handle more of the cargo available and could 
maximize profits from each pound of freight. In other words, payload 
translated into profits. Since the Super Universal had the lowest payload 
capacity, company management judged it outmoded (see table 2).35 
Table 2.  Comparative Performance Figures. 
 First 
Flight 
Payload Power Speed Range 
Fokker Super 
Universal 
1928 750 lbs 400 hp  
P&W Wasp 
118 mph 700 miles 
Bellanca 
Pacemaker 
1928 1050 lbs 300 hp  
Wright J-6 
Whirlwind 
140 mph 850 miles 
Fairchild 71 1928 1025 lbs (float) 
1365 lbs (skis) 
425 hp  
P&W Wasp C 
102 mph (float) 
110 mph (skis) 
650 miles (float) 
750 miles (skis) 
Junkers 
W33/34 
1926 1608 lbs (float) 
2125 (skis) 
400 hp  
P&W Wasp 
100 mph (float) 
108 mph (skis) 
490 miles (float) 
530 miles (skis) 
 
Payload and performance, however, were not the only fronts of 
comparison. With greater competition, the company began to see 
passenger comfort as significant. For instance, in 1932 W.E. Gilbert, one 
of the Mackenzie pilots, commented that compared to the better insulated 
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and heated Fairchilds, the Fokkers were uncomfortably cold in the winter. 
While this difference might not have caused much discomfort on other 
routes, Gilbert commented,  
Passengers dressed for ordinary Winter travel are not likely to experience much 
discomfort even in under-heated machines in flights of less than an hour’s 
duration… The average flight in this District over a year’s time is in excess of 50 
minutes duration, while the usual ‘legs’ in our ‘through’ traffic to Great Bear Lake 
are all in excess of 2 1/2 hours (McMurray to Fitzgerald: Fitzgerald to Rae: Rae to 
Cameron Bay). Conditions of cold or cramped sitting which may be endured for an 
hour are much aggravated when met for 8 hours in one day, in stages of 2 1/2 
hours each. 
While Canadian Airways’ flights in other bush districts averaged, at 
most, 79 miles, the average flight distance along the Mackenzie was 150 
miles.36 Gilbert went on to say, 
I do not think that the Company has ever given enough thought to the 
psychological effect of petty discomforts on the passenger’s general attitude 
toward the Company, especially when the passenger happens to be an important 
customer for freighting.37 
Gilbert’s comments highlight changing passenger expectations and, at 
the same time, point out the impact of changing geography on passenger 
experience. His assessment was apparently confirmed by G.A. Thompson, 
who noted in 1933 that the company was receiving a growing number of 
complaints about the discomfort of its bush services in comparison to the 
services available on southern trunk lines.38 
Closer to home, Mackenzie Air Service’s aircraft presented a study in 
passenger comfort. In December of 1932, Gilbert reported that Brintnell’s 
airline had introduced a Super retro-fitted with “an exceptionally good 
heating system, a toilet, and a lot of other ‘frills’, which, while they don’t 
mean much in fact, are going to be the means of causing the passengers 
that ride with him to find ground for a great deal of comparisons 
unfavourable to our equipment.”39 Brintnell reinforced this unflattering 
contrast by broadcasting “a considerable amount of very sarcastic 
criticism” of Canadian Airways’ aircraft.40 The concern for Canadian 
Airways’ managers was how to respond to this assault. 
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Dickins proposed replacing two Supers with two Junkers as a means of 
counter-acting perceptions of the fleet as weak and outdated in the hope 
that placing the Junkers, with their metal skins, greater payloads, and 
more powerful engines, alongside Brintnell’s aircraft would highlight the 
inadequacies of the competition’s machines.41 The airline also created a 
special passenger service that ran between Fort McMurray and Great Bear 
Lake. The company wanted this to be a deluxe service that had “every 
comfort possible… provided for passengers in an endeavour to give them 
a speedy and comfortable service.”42 In addition to comfort, speed was 
another important consideration. Thompson felt that a higher speed would 
reduce the time passengers spent in the plane, minimizing their 
discomfort.43 This special passenger service used Bellanca and Fairchild 
aircraft exclusively and the company sought to confine freight to other 
machines as much as it possibly could. 
This decline manifested itself in another way: the Super’s apparent age 
became a sticking point as company officials became interested in the 
aircraft’s newness. Gilbert noted that the machines’ structures were 
deteriorating under the constant pounding they received on northern 
operations and believed the deterioration would only increase as the 
aircraft’s metal aged.44 Both Joseph Corn and Eric Shatzberg discuss in 
detail the place of progress ideologies in the history of aviation, pointing 
out the close association between aviation and ideas of progress.45 In 
particular, Schatzberg argues that the 1931 crash of a wooden winged 
Fokker trimotor spelled the end of Fokker’s aircraft in the American 
passenger airline industry. Although this event likely influenced American 
airlines’ fleet choices, there is no evidence that it had any direct bearing 
on Canadian Airways’ fleet composition. That said, it may have 
contributed to the management’s perception of the Fokker Super 
Universal as outmoded. From Canadian Airways manager’s comments, it 
appears that at least some concern about modernity had penetrated the 
Canadian North.  The desire for new aircraft and a willingness to equate 
new or new-looking machines with better technology had definite echoes 
of the cultural links between technical newness and progress which Corn 
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and Shatzberg identify. These associations and management’s perception 
of the public’s preferences encouraged the administrators to re-evaluate 
the Super Universal’s suitability for the Mackenzie. Thus, Canadian 
Airways sought to respond to the perceived demand for modernity their 
by reconfiguring the Mackenzie District’s fleet composition and 
substituting Fairchilds, Bellancas, and Junkers for the Fokkers. Though of 
the same age as the Supers, these aircraft avoided its Spartan discomfort 
and dated appearance. 
Conclusion 
These considerations, payload, efficiency, comfort, and newness, 
prompted Canadian Airways’ managers to revise their assessment of the 
Super Universal. By 1933, in their opinions, it was no longer the aircraft 
best suited to the Mackenzie and the company began withdrawing the 
aircraft from the district and by the end of 1933, only one Super Universal 
remained in Canadian Airways’ Mackenzie fleet. Looking behind these 
events reveals that this was not simply an instance of a newer model 
replacing an older, outdated one. Instead, the Super Universal’s decline 
and replacement was the result of a multifaceted set of historical 
circumstances. First, the discovery of radium on the eastern shores of 
Great Bear Lake created a prospecting rush and altered the geography of 
aviation in the Mackenzie District. By establishing a new destination, the 
formation of mining camps encouraged Canadian Airways to develop new 
regular air routes that necessitated longer flight distances. 
Unfortunately for Canadian Airways, this rush also supported Canadian 
Airways’ new competition, Mackenzie Air Services.  Competition was an 
issue because the economic conditions of the Great Depression made 
Mackenzie District traffic essential to Canadian Airways’ health. 
Mackenzie Air Services’ willingness to overload its aircraft in order to be 
able to charge much lower rates further complicated the situation. 
Prevented by geography from having weight regulations enforced in the 
North, Canadian Airways focused on maximizing the efficiency of its own 
operations in order to maximize its profits from the lower rates it was 
forced to charge in order to compete with Mackenzie Air Services. Given 
the new emphasis on efficiency, particularly on payload, and the inability 
of the Fokker Super Universal to carry the necessary loads of cargo over 
the longer distances required to reach Great Bear Lake, the Fokker Super 
Universal’s suitability for the Mackenzie seemed much less certain. These 
distances also highlighted the discomfort of passengers flying on Supper 
Universals in winter. At the same time, the economic situation meant 
Canadian Airways needed to secure as much of the Mackenzie traffic as 
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possible. By 1933 the Super’s faults became significant enough that 
Canadian Airways retired the aircraft from the district. Beneath the details 
of payload and speeds, what this case study reveals is not just the deep 
connection between historical circumstances and users’ evaluations of 
technologies’ value. It also highlights the significant role of geography in 
the history of Canadian aviation and points to the importance of 
considering physical geography in the history of technology more 
generally. 
